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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 A Background 
 There is unprecedented interest in decentralised systems of governance in many 
African and other developing states. A number of them have established 
constitutionally entrenched system of local governance.1 Various forces and 
desires drive the decentralisation programmes of the states. Yet, there are three 
drivers which are common for the decentralisation programme of many states. 
The first is the wish to enhance democratic system and public participation and 
the recognition that decentralisation is favourable for achieving this objective. 
The second is the urgency to improve the living standard of the population of the 
developing states and the conviction that decentralisation can bring development. 
The third is the urgency to accommodate diversity with a view to maintain a 
lasting peace.    
1.1 Stating the Problem 
Ethiopia, like other developing states, is in a process of implementing a 
decentralisation programme. The decentralisation process began in 1991 when the 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) came to power. In 1995 a new 
Constitution was promulgated which formally established the country on a federal 
basis with a federal government at the centre and nine ethnically defined regional 
state at the periphery. The 1995 Constitution, in addition, laid the foundation for 
further decentralisation by requiring the regional states to establish and 
adequately empower local government.2 The objectives that underpin the creation 
and empowerment of local government, as envisaged in the Constitution are, to 
enhance public participation, ensure the provision of efficient service delivery 
and accommodation of ethnic minorities.3 The regional states of the country, 
therefore, have a constitutional obligation to create adequately empowered local 
                                                           
1
 World Bank (1999) 107. 
2Art 50(4) of FDRE Constitution (1995).  
3
 See Art 50(4) & 39(3) of FDRE Constitution 1995. 
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government. This study, therefore, inquires into whether the regional states are 
discharging their constitutional obligation of creating adequately empowered 
local government. It will attempt to do so by examining the decentralisation 
programme of four of the nine regional states of the Ethiopian federation. 
1.2 Argument 
The argument in this study is developed in the following manner. First, it will be 
examined whether decentralisation is favourable for democratisation, 
development and accommodation of ethnic minorities. Second, institutional 
frameworks will be identified which will be used to examine whether Ethiopia’s 
local government is indeed empowered enough to achieve these objectives. Third, 
the structural organisation, powers and functions of local government of four of 
the nine regional states of Ethiopia will be described. The regional states are 
Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples’ 
regional states. Fourth the Ethiopian local governance system will be assessed in 
light of the institutional principles that are identified in chapter 2. 
1.3 Significance 
As was briefly indicated above, decentralisation is claimed to be favourable for 
democratisation, development and for accommodating diversity. If this claim is 
true, enquiring into the existence of an effective system of decentralised 
governance in Ethiopia is extremely significant. The country is one of the most 
impoverished states in Africa. Thus, a workable governance system which brings 
about development is exceedingly needed in the country. The country has been 
under decades of undemocratic monarchical and totalitarian rule. Therefore, 
democracy and public participation is critical for the country. By creating ethnic-
based federalism, the country has attempted to answer in part ethnic related 
questions. However, as each regional state is inhabited by a number of ethnic 
groups. An inquiry into whether the interests of these ethnic minorities are 
accommodated is worthwhile.  
1.4 Synopsis of the Study 
The study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is an introductory chapter 
to the study. Thus in this chapter the background, significance and arguments of 
the study are discussed. In the second chapter the concept of decentralisation will 
be dealt with. To that effect, the definitions and forms decentralisation will be 
discussed. The arguments in favour and against decentralisation will be raised. 
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Additionally, the criteria which will be used to gauge the adequacy of the 
empowerment of local government in Ethiopia will be set up. The third chapter 
will provide the highlights of the historical background of the governance 
systems of the country. Chapter four is devoted to the discussion of the rationales 
behind the ongoing process of decentralisation in the country. In chapter five the 
local governance system of the four regional states will be discussed in detail. 
This discussion will focus on the structural organisation, functions, powers and 
financial sources of local government. In the final chapter, the trend in adequately 
empowering local government in Ethiopia will be assessed and a conclusion on 
the discussion will be provided. Finally, in light of the assessments, 
recommendations will be forwarded.    
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology used in elucidating the concept of decentralisation and setting 
the criteria for gauging the adequacy of the empowerment of local government is 
a study of international literature. The third chapter, in which the background to 
the governance system of Ethiopia is dealt with, results from a study of literature 
on Ethiopian history and the country’s governance system and its previous 
constitutions. Government policy documents are consulted in writing the fourth 
chapter. The regional constitutions of the Ahmara, Tigray, SNNP and Oromia 
regional states will be examined to write.                                                      
 
Chapter 2 
                               Decentralisation: Conceptual Exposition 
2.1 Introduction 
The central aim of this study is to assess the trend in decentralising governmental 
powers and in adequately empowering local government in Ethiopia. It goes 
without saying this task requires the need to create a degree of clarity on the 
concept of decentralisation. In this part of the study, therefore, the decentrlisation 
will be defined and its various forms of will be discussed. Also arguments both in 
favour and against a decentralisation will be deliberated. Finally, criterions which 
will help us gauge the adequacy of the power of local government in Ethiopia will 
be laid down.   
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2.2 Definition of Decentralisation  
 There is no commonly accepted definition of decentrlisation.  Nevertheless, 
almost all authors who attempted to define the concept often hold that 
decentralisation involves, even if in varied forms, transferring responsibilities, 
powers, functions and resources from a centre to peripheral governmental 
institutions.4  Yet, decentralisation is not meant to deprive the centre of all 
political powers.5  There are certain areas of authorities which are appropriate to 
the national actors and other areas of authorities which are appropriate to sub-
national actors. “Both national and sub-national actors have a complementary role 
to play. However, their role needs to be “determined by analyzing the most 
effective ways and means of achieving a desired objective.”6 
2.3 Forms of Decentralisation 
Decentralisation takes various forms. The most known ones are deconcentration 
(also known as administrative decentralisation), devolution (democratic 
decentralisation) and delegation. 
 
2.3.1 Deconcentration or Administrative Decentralisation 
Deconcentration, also known as administrative decentralisation,7 is the transfer of 
responsibilities, authorities and resources from a centre to local units of the 
centre.8 Through deconcentration, powers and responsibilities are transferred to 
governmental institutions within the jurisdictional authority of the central 
government.9 Therefore, a local unit which enjoys deconcentrated power, is 
ultimately answerable to the centre; even if it may have certain discretion,.10 
Deconcentration may be either general or functional. General deconcentration 
takes place when a variety of tasks are deconcentrated to local level.11 Functional 
                                                           
4
 “[D]ecentralisation is commonly regarded as a process through which powers, functions, 
responsibilities and resources are transferred from central to local governments and/or to other 
decentralized entities howsoever defined.”   Kauzya (2005) 4. 
5
 UNDP (1998) 1. 
6
 UNDP(1998) 1. 
7
 Manor ( 1999) at 5.  
8
 De Visser (2005) at 14;  Assefa (2003) at 5; Rondinelli &  Nellis (1986) at 5.   
9
  De Visser (2005) at 14;  UNDP (1998) at 3; Manor (1999) at 5.   
10
 Degefa (2003) 5. 
11
 UNDP (1999) at 7. 
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deconcentration on the other hand comes about when specific tasks are 
deconcentrated to field units of the centre.12 
2.3.2 Delegation  
Delegation refers to a situation where decision-making and administrative 
authority and responsibility for definite tasks are transferred from a centre to an 
autonomous sub-national unit.13  The central government defines the powers 
which are to be transferred. It also puts conditions under which the delegated 
powers are exercised. Moreover, the centre can take back the powers which are so 
transferred through delegation. 14 Yet, the sub-national government is viewed as 
an autonomous entity. Hence, it is left with a wide range of discretion in the 
exercising of the powers and responsibilities transferred to it.15The relationship of 
the central government and the sub-national government which is entrusted with 
delegated powers is characterised as a ‘principal-agent relationship’.16 Therefore, 
the central government bears the ultimate responsibility for the decisions of the 
local unit.17 
2.3.3 Devolution or democratic decentralisation 
Devolution refers to a situation where a local level government is constituted 
legally as a ‘separate governance body’18 and that powers and responsibilities are 
transferred to such unit on permanent basis.19  This form of decentralisation is 
referred to as “genuine decentralisation.”20 
 
 Devolution implies the autonomy of the lower level unit.21 The lower level unit 
has distinct and legally recognised geographical boundaries and legal 
personality.22 The powers and responsibilities are transferred to it through 
constitutional or other similar legislative instruments.23 Hence, as De Visser 
states, the power so transferred will become an original power of the sub-national 
                                                           
12
  UNDP (1999) at 7. 
13
  UNDP (1999) at 7; De Visser (2005) at 14.    
14
  De Visser (2005) at14. 
15
 De Visser (2005) at 14. 
16
 Degefa (2003) at 7. 
17
 Degefa (2003) at 7. 
18
 Manor (1999) at 6. 
19
 De Visser(2005)15. 
20
 UNDP (1999). 
21UNDP (1999); Olowu (2001) at 3. 
22
 Olowu ( 2001) at 3. 
23
 Olowu ( 2001) at 3. 
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entity.24 As a result, the sub-national entities will not be accountable to the central 
government for its decisions.25  
2.4 Why all the fuss about decentralisation? 
Many countries are demonstrating unparalleled interest in a decentralised form of 
governance. The interest is even more conspicuous in hitherto centralised 
developing countries.26 There are, among others, three key rationales behind this 
growing interest in decentralisation. The first rationale is the desire to achieve 
democratisation and enhance public participation. The second major rationale is 
the wish to reduce the prevalence of poverty in these countries. The third major 
rationale is that, in ethnically diverse states, decentralisation is viewed as a means 
to prevent or contain ethnic conflicts and to accommodate diversity within a 
unified state. 
2.4.1 Decentralisation and democracy and public participation 
There is a general agreement that there is a direct relationship between 
decentralisation and democratisation. This is based on a premise that 
decentralisation creates multiple electoral positions at at multiple levels of 
government.27. The existence of multiple representative institutions which results 
from decentralisation broadens the scope the peoples representation. Hence, 
decentralisation enhances democracy.28 Also the extent of popular participation is 
influenced by the size of a political unit. The smaller the size of a political unit, 
the more favourable it will be for public participation.29 One aspect of this 
reasoning is that public participation necessitates a direct or indirect personal 
contact of the community with the public institutions. This becomes possible only 
                                                           
24
 De Visser (2005) at 15. 
25
 De Visser (2005) at 15. 
26A joint study by World Bank and two United Nations organizations in the early 1990s reveals 
that sixty three out of seventy-five developing countries with a population of over 5 million had 
embarked on a program of transferring political power to their local government.  Also eighty 
percent of developing and transition countries of the Eastern and central European countries and 
the former Soviet Union have started a process of decentralisation. Olowu & Wunsch (2004) 
2;World Bank(2000) at107. 
27
 Chhatre 2008; 13; Crook 2003; 79. 
28
 Crook (undated); 408.  
29
 “If , then, democracy belongs to sphere of the political, of decision making for an association or 
collectivity, then a system of collective decision making can be defined as ‘democratic to the 
extent that it is subject to control by all members of the relevant association considered as equal. 
Popular control and political equality are the key democratic principles.  They are most fully 
realised in small groups or associations.” Beetham (1996) 30. 
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when a political unit is smaller in size.30 Decentralisation, by reducing the size of 
a political unit, brings government closer to the people and enhances public 
access to political institutions.31 Such access bolsters opportunities for public 
participation in political affairs. An active popular participation in turn results in 
an entrenched culture of democratic governance; not only at local level but also at 
national level.32    
The other aspect of this argument is that decentralisation creates small political 
units. This creates incentive for participation.33 The reason is that the 
consequences of a political decision are more visible and immediate in smaller 
political units.34 On the other hand the effect of the decisions which takes place at 
national level is relatively remote. The propinquity of the effect of the decisions 
of local political units on the lives of local residents motivates the local people to 
provide a close attention to such local units.35 Also related to the public 
participation rationale is accountability. Scholars claim that decentralisation 
enables local people to control and evaluate the performance or 
underperformance of local authorities.36 When an underperformance is detected, 
local citizens will hold local authorities accountable and take measures which are 
under their disposal.37 
2.4.2 Decentralisation, poverty reduction and development 
The urgency in many developing states to reduce poverty and bring development 
is the second major reason behind the growing interest in decentralisation.38 By 
development what is meant here an improved living standard of the local 
citizenry which results from efficient service delivery. As it was seen above, 
decentralisation has a direct bearing on democratisation and the ‘quality of 
governance’.39 Good governance is considered as a key factor, both in its own 
                                                           
30
 Tuene (1995) at 15; Dowding (1996) at 53. 
31
 Tuene (1995) 53.  
32
“ Local political institutions would be an essential element in a system of democratic 
government, because they widen the opportunity to participate and provide the capacity to educate 
the citizens in practice of politics and government” Stoker (1996) at 5. 
33
  Beetham  (1996) at 30. 
34
 Beetham (1996) at 30; Tuene (1995) at 25.  
35
 Tuene (1995) at 25. 
36
 Treisman (2002) at 4. 
37
 Beetham (1996) at 31. 
38
 Kauzya ( 2005) at 2. 
39
 Beetham (1996) at 27.  
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right and as a means to reduce poverty.40 Good governance which comes about 
with a genuine decentralisation positively encourages “both civil society and the 
private sector to invest and commit themselves to a country and its localities”.41 It 
also encourages foreign direct investment. International financial and 
development organisations will be keen to assist development activities when 
there is good governance in a country.42 Therefore, decentralisation, by 
augmenting democratisation and good governance, paves the way for poverty 
reduction and development. 
 
Efficiency is the other development related argument in favour of 
decentralisation. Decentralised government units are believed to be conducive to 
the efficient formulation and the implementation of development plans.43 As was 
seen above, decentralised government units are closer to the beneficiary of the 
development activities. Their size facilitates the involvement of the local citizenry 
in the formulation and implementation of development activities.44 The 
involvement of the local citizens will make the planning and implementation of 
the development activities to be founded on first hand information and in 
accordance with the wishes of the people.45 Furthermore, for the same reasons, 
decentralisation enhances efficient delivery of basic services to the local people.46 
 
Again, related to with the efficiency argument, it is claimed that decentralising 
policy making power to the local level allows various policies to be considered 
simultaneously.47 In centralised system only one policy can be tested at a time. If, 
at all a new superior policy choices are discovered, the process will be slow and 
                                                           
40
 Braun & Grote (2000) at 5; Katsiaouni (2003) at15.  
41
 Katsiaouni (2003) at 15. 
42
 Katsiaouni (2003) at 15. 
43
 World Bank ( 2000) at 108. 
44
 World Bank ( 2000) at 108; Tuene (1995). 
45
 “The superiority of decentralized government over a centralized system derives... from superior 
information and increased participatory decision making. Local information flows should make 
the identification of more effective ways of providing services easier and increase government 
awareness of local needs and better targeting, while higher participation rates in local politics 
should give more voice to the poor in policy choices” Brosio (2002) at 5; Stoker (1996) at 5.  
46
 “Public service delivery is more equitable, efficient, of a higher quality and better geared 
towards responding to local requirements and conditions as local authorities are by definition 
closer to the problems.”  Stocker (1996) 5. 
47
 Strumpf (2002) at207. 
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involves a risk with broader consequences.48 In contrast, the risk of policy 
innovation by a local unit is limited within a locality. Yet, the lesson which is 
derived from such experimentation will be useful to the rest of the country. To 
sum up, decentralisation transforms local governments into “laboratories of 
democracy”.49  
2.4.3 Decentralisation as a means to prevent ethnic clashes 
The other rationale for decentralisation is empowering ethnic minorities and 
thereby preventing or mitigating ethnic conflicts.50 Generally accommodating 
diverse ethnic groups within a single political unit is raised in connection with a 
federal system. Yet, it is maintained by many scholars that decentrlisation may 
serve the same purpose. Thus, in a country with a diverse ethnic makeup, 
decentralisation may provide a territorial and political space to where ethnic 
minorities can be accommodated. This will allow ethnic minorities to exercise 
self-governance to maintain their culture and way of life. 51  Their participation in 
the public sphere under decentralised systems will also have a ‘stabilising’ 
effect.52   
 
It is also argued that decentralised system establishes a political channel which 
serves as a forum for dialogue and reconciliation. In addition it allows minority 
ethnic groups to have a greater control over local issues, and to deal with them in 
their own way.53 Therefore, in a decentralised system, it is likely that key 
concerns of ethnic minorities will be given due consideration.54 Furthermore, 
decentralised system gives ethnic minorities the chance to use their language for 
work and education in their localities and to develop their culture. Through 
decentralised system of governance a flexible institutional mechanism which 
accommodates diverse concerns of diverse population within a single state or 
province can be created.55 
                                                           
48
 Strumpf (2002) at207. 
49
 Strumpf (2002) at207. 
50Siegle & O’Mahony (2008).  
51
 Brancati (undated) 8.  
52
 Mahakanjana (2006) at 7.  
53
 Tranchant (2007) at 3. 
54
 Brancati (2008) at 49. 
55
 Kauzya (2005) at 11. 
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2.5 Risks of decentralisation 
Both of those who favour and disfavour decentralisation admit that 
decentralisation poses certain risks. One such concern is that a decentralisation is 
prone for capture by corrupt and non-accountable local ‘elites’.56 This may work 
against both decentralised democracy democracy and development. 
Decentralisation may be used to promote divisive demands.  It is further argued 
that it may even be used to promote secessionist agenda.57  Rather than 
stabilising, decentralisation may lead to inter-ethnic competition and conflict.58 
Instead of bringing development, decentralisation may destabilise the macro 
economy and lead to an inequitable growth among different localities.59    
 
Those who are in favour of decentrlised system, while accepting that 
decentralisation may pose some risks maintain that the risks are not typical to a 
decentralised system. Concerning the possibility of the capture of power by non-
accountable and corrupt authorities, for example, they argue that the risk is also 
present in a centralised system.60 They even claim that, as the corrupt activities of 
those in centralised system have the tendency of having a nationwide effect, they 
are even more harmful than those in a decentralised system. The maintain ruling 
out decentralisation for the fear of a risk of non accountable and corrupt local 
authorities is not the rational thing to do. Rather the effort should be directed at 
creating effective system in which corrupt authorities are held responsible.61 
 
With respect to the argument that decentralisation may worsen inter-ethnic 
conflict and let lose secessionist groups, the opposite view is that centralised 
system is rather inherently repressive of ethnic diversity. It neither allows diverse 
ethnic groups to share power nor does it offer them the chance to administer 
themselves.62  
                                                           
56
  Brosio (2000) at 4.  
57
 Stoker (1996); Brancati (undated) 10   
58
 Brancati (2008) 10. 
59
 De Visser (2005) at 27. 
60
 De Visser (2005) at 27. 
61
 “If corruption at sub national level is anticipated, it should be dealt with in the same way as 
corruption at central level is dealt with. It should be countered by establishing a culture of 
accountability and transparency within the local government structures and not by centralizing 
government, which will result in loss of the benefits of decentralization” De Visser (2005) at 30. 
62
 Jinadu (2007) at 25. 
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“In view of the salience of ethnicity as a political force, the decentralization or 
devolution of political power ... is a constructive way of dealing with it by giving 
ethnic groups local, sub-national spaces to run and control their own internal affairs. 
This political structure is problematic in that it may harden ethnic identity and 
antagonisms, aggravate separatist agitations and engender a new post-conflict cycle of 
violence, unrest and fragmentation. Yet, it is a better one than a centralized political 
structure, which gives no room for, indeed tends to stifle the expression of ethnic 
interests and demands and is, therefore, prone to even more violent forms of ethno-
political conflict.” 63  
 
Moreover as Jinadu argues, the majority-minority ratio of ethnic groups is most 
often unchanging.64 A centralised system, therefore, keeps the ethnic majorities in 
power while marginalising the minorities. When ethnic minorities are kept 
marginalised, they will tend to resort to violence to have their interest recognised. 
Often the post colonial history of African states and the recent history of the 
former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia is presented to demonstrate how 
excessive repression of ethnic differences through excessive centralisation may 
end up in a violent break up of a country.65  A Decentralised system, conversely, 
believed to furnish ethnic minorities with a space to take care of their own affairs 
make it possible for people of diverse identity to live together in harmony.66 
 
Others in response to the concern the argument that decentralisation may 
endanger the nationwide development of the country by affecting the macro 
economy leading to inequitable growth and service delivery among localities, 
argue that local governance is not a substitute to central governance.67 Thus the 
central government will play a role to stabilise the macro economy and to 
maintain equitable development among the localities. The most important role 
that the central government plays in this regard is supervision.68  De Visser says; 
the supervisory role of the central government has three elements. That is 
regulation, monitoring and redistribution.69 Using its regulatory power, the central 
government puts forth a legal framework that creates a developmental local 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
63
 Jinadu (2007) at 25 
64
 Jinadu ( 2007) at 19. That is true unless a given ethnic minority secedes and becomes a majority 
in the new state.    
65
 Jinadu(2007) at 19.  
66
 World Bank (2000) at 107.   
67
 UNDP (1998) 1. 
68
 De Visser ( 2005) at 43. 
69
 De Visser (2005) at 44. 
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government.70 By using its monitoring power it checks whether or not the local 
government is accomplishing its developmental mission.71 In the event that a 
failure to discharge this obligation is detected on the part of the local government, 
the central government takes measures which may range from simple warning to 
actual intervention.72 Furthermore, it counters inequitable growth among the 
localities through redistribution.73      
2.6. Adequately empowered local government 
As has been discussed above, decentralised governance system has a number of 
advantages. It offers institutional mechanisms for democratic governance and 
enhanced public participation.74 Decentralisation may be favourable for 
development75 and to accommodate diversity.76 On the other hand, as it was seen 
at the beginning, decentralisation may take different forms. The question here is; 
what kind of decentralisation does serve this purposes? 
 
Based on what was discussed in the preceding sections it is submitted that any 
decentralised system which aspires to achieve the aforementioned objectives 
needs to sufficiently empower local government. A sufficiently empowered local 
government, for the purpose of this study, must have the following features. It 
must be democratically constituted. It must have exclusive functional 
competences in certain areas of governance, which are clearly defined by national 
or regional constitution or other similar legislation. Therefore it must have a 
definitive decision making power on matters within its competences. It must also 
allow locally concentrated ethnic groups to administer themselves. In addition, it 
must have its own adequate financial sources. 
                                                           
70
 De Visser (2005) at 44. 
71
  De Visser (2005) at 44. 
72
 De Visser (2005) at 44. 
73
“Whether decentralization exacerbates income differences among regions or becomes a positive 
force in efforts to alleviate poverty depends on...horizontal equity or the extent to which sub-
national governments have the fiscal capacity to deliver an equivalent level of service to their 
population... Tax bases vary substantially from region to region and from city to city, but tax rates 
cannot. A local government with a relatively small tax base cannot compensate by imposing much 
higher tax without losing business and residents to jurisdiction with lower taxes...To correct for 
such variation, most decentralized fiscal system include [equalization grant].” World Bank (2000) 
at 110; De Visser (2005) at 45.  
74
 See above § 1.3.1. 
75
 See above § 1.3.2. 
76
 See above § 1.3.3. 
 16 
 
2.6.1 Democratic local government  
It was shown above that one of the main rationales for opting for decentralised 
system of governance is the need to create democratic system at local level.77 A 
democratic local government exists when it is participatory, accountable and 
responsive for local interests.78 In order to create such a democratic local 
government, therefore, local government should be constituted by elected official 
rather than by centrally appointed officials.79  
 
Holding periodical election of local authorities is a quintessential of democratic 
local governance. However it is not sufficient. A democratic system of local 
governance should also be participatory. Thus a system in which, the local people 
can take part in the decision making process of local governance system should 
be devised.80 As De Visser states there should be a mechanism for “an ongoing 
process of debate, dialogue and communication between the local government 
authority and the community”.81  
2.6.2 Functional competences  
In order to claim that a local government is adequately empowered, functional 
competences in certain areas of governance should be devolved to it.82 The 
functional areas should be formally devolved to the local government. That is the 
powers devolved to local level should be clearly provided in a national or 
state/regional constitutions or in other similar pieces of legislation.83 This helps to 
clearly identify the functional boundaries of the power of local government and to 
protect them from undue intrusion by the central government. 84 In that particular 
area, the local government should be able to exercise all governmental powers i.e. 
legislative, executive and administrative powers.85  
 
The functional competences devolved to the local government should be 
appropriate to it. The functions should be within implementing capacity of the 
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local unit.86 In addition they should be pertinent to the objectives that 
decentralisation is meant to achieve. 
2.6.3 Self administration of territorially integrated ethnic minorities 
In a country with diverse ethnic groups, genuine decentralisation should cater for 
ethnic minorities.87 Thus an ethnic group should be allowed to establish its own 
government structure in the geographical area that it inhabits. Furthermore, these 
institutions should be provided with pertinent functional competences. The 
functional competences should be pertinent in particular to allow the ethnic 
groups to decide among other things on their cultural matters including the right 
to use their language for work and education.  
  
In order to do so ethnic minorities should be territorially structured.88 The local 
administration should, therefore, be established based on the settlement pattern of 
the ethnic groups.89 Decentralisation may not be of use to accommodate 
territorially dispersed ethnic groups.90 
 
2.6.4 Adequate financial sources 
Decentralising powers and functions to local government should be accompanied 
by fiscal decentralisation in a form of devolved taxing and spending powers.91 
Hence local government should be given certain taxing powers which will enable 
it to collect as much revenue as is required to discharge its functions.92 Moreover, 
it should be allowed to collect fees in return for the services that it delivers to the 
local people. The reason behind the requirement for the financial independence of 
local government, in addition to enabling it to discharge its functions, is to 
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maintain the autonomy of the local government and to ensure its accountability to 
the local people.93  
 
However, in transferring taxing power to local level, the appropriateness of the 
tax to local government should be taken into account. Anwar Shah provides us 
with three points which should be considered in determining the suitability of a 
tax to sub-national governments. The points are the efficiency of the common 
market, national equity and administrative costs.94He states, the internal common 
market is efficient if all resources can freely move within a state.95 Some taxes, if 
assigned at sub national level, may result in distortion of the national market for 
resources which are mobile. Thus such taxes should be maintained by central 
government.96 He also said, tax can be used as an instrument of redistributive 
equity. Taxes that are redistributive in nature, if assigned at local level, may result 
in inequity.97 That is because those areas with good tax bases keep developing 
while those with poor tax bases remain destitute. He further said assigning certain 
type of taxes at local level may result in increased cost of collection. Thus in 
assigning a tax at sub national level, the cost of collection should also be 
considered.98 
2.6.5. Supervision  
The central government should exercise supervisory power over local 
government. 99 Supervsion has three elements. Firstly, the central government 
should set up a a legisltative framework within which local government can 
exercise its power. Central govenremnt shouls also continuously assess the 
effective functioning of local government.100 If, the central government should 
assist the local government if it is found out that the latter is malfunctioning. If 
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the problem is persistent, the central government should be able to take other 
measures such as directly exercising the functions of the local government.101 So 
long as local government is effective, however, the central government should not 
meddle itself in local matters.102  
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the meaning and the different forms of decentralisation are 
explained. In addition the arguments in favour of and against decentralised forms 
governance are considered. Further, a number of factors which should be taken 
into account in determining the adequacy of the empowerment of local 
government are established. Accordingly, local government should be 
democratically constituted and it should have an exclusive area of governance. 
Also it should be autonomous in a sense that it should not be controlled by the 
central government. The role of the central government should be limited to 
supervising it.  In addition it should be constituted in such a way that it allows 
locally concentrated ethnic minorities to govern themselves.   
                                                 Chapter 3 
                     A Background on the Ethiopian governance system 
3.1 Introduction 
It is hardly possible to understand the factors underpinning the decentralisation 
programme under implementation in Ethiopia without a brief discussion on 
Ethiopia’s political history. This chapter, therefore, will provide a succinct 
historical account of the governance system of the country. 
3.2 Towards centralisation and back 
 Historians agree that Ethiopia is among the oldest civilisations in the world. 
Ethiopia’s origin as state is traced back to the Axumite Empire, which was 
formed some 2000 years ago in the northern part of the country.103 Since the 
Axumite time various dynasties most notably the Tigrayans, the Agew and the 
Amhara dynasties had ruled and expanded the Empire southward.104 As the 
Empire expanded, more and more diverse ethnic groups have been incorporated 
into it. The expansion of the Ethiopian Empire reached its apex and Ethiopia got 
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its present shape during the reign of Emperor Menelik II, in the last two decades 
of the 19th century.105 
Ethiopia had a decentralised governance system throughout much of its existence 
as a state.106 This decentralised system was characterised by the co-existence of 
triple authorities: Autonomous kings107 and provincial and local nobilities 
exercised powers within their area while at the same time recognising the 
imperial throne as the central authority.108 Scholars maintain that the colossal size 
of the country, its rugged and broken landscape, the economic and cultural 
diversity of its people, and the absence of a modern means of communication 
were the root causes of the decentralised system and structure. 109 In the second 
half of the 19th century, however, Emperor Tewodros II (1855-1868) set the 
centralisation process in motion by bringing an end to the autonomy of regional 
and local nobilities.110 This process of expansion and the centralisation was 
pursued vigorously by Emperor Menelik II in which he created the country’s 
current boundary.111  
The centralisation process was further pursued by Emperor Haile Selassie I. The 
Emperor used formal mechanism to centrlise power. In 1931, the Emperor 
proclaimed the first written Constitution of the country.112 The Constitution 
provided the Emperor with absolute power over the central provincial and local 
government. It also ended the autonomy of the nobilities and the provincial 
governors.113  
Subsequently, in 1940s with declared intent to modernise and unify the country, 
the Emperor introduced a uniform local administrative system.114 The country 
was divided into a number of teklay gizat (provinces). Each teklay gizat 
(province) was divided into awraja ghizat  and, woreda ghizat and mikitil woreda 
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thereby creating a three tiered local governance system.115 Before this reform the 
country was divided into ghizat (province) and into a number of awrja (districts). 
The reform was proclaimed through decree No 1/1942 and decree No 6/42. The 
two decrees created a number tekaly gizhat, awraja, woreda and mikitl woreda 
thereby creating four tiers of local governance system.116 The power of local 
government was, nevertheless, limited to discharging administrative 
responsibilities such as collecting taxes and maintaining law and order.117  
In 1974 members of the army constituted a committee which led the overthrow of 
the Emperor from the throne. They established a provisional military government 
which was to be known as the “Derg” government, after the committee which led 
the coup.118 The provisional government suspended the Constitution. It also 
accepted socialism as its political ideology.119 Consequently it nationalised the 
land and all private financial, industrial and commercial establishments and put 
the country under a command economy. 120 
 Derg adopted without change the formal structure of local governance system 
from the imperial era in its entirety.121 Therefore, under the Derg regime local 
government’s role was limited to implementing the policies and decisions of the 
centre.122 In 1987, Derg came up with a new Constitution. The Constitution 
provided that the country was a unitary state comprising administrative and 
autonomous regions.123 The administrative regions were units of administration 
hierarchically established from the highest to the lowest.124 The administrative 
regions were in turn divided into a number of awraja.  
3.3 Back to decentralisation 
The centralisation proccess which progressed in the country for over a century 
was at odd with the historical reality and social, economic and ethnic diversity in 
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the country. It led to the concentration of all political and economic powers 
within a group of specific ethnic and social background leaving the rest 
marginalised and disgruntled.125 This in turn led to a half a century of protest and 
decades of civil war in the country.126  
After a long and horrendous civil war, on 29 May 1991 the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) forces toppled the Derg and took power.  Few 
days later, through a national conference held in Addis Ababa and with the 
participation of about 30 political parties, a Transitional Period Charter was 
adopted.127 The Charter established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
(TGE)128 and served as an interim constitution of the country until 1994.  
The Charter began reversing the centralisation process. Accordingly, it 
recognised the right of “nations and nationalities” to self governance.129 
Consequently, it called for the establishment of regional and local government on 
the basis of the settlement pattern the various ethnic groups of the country.130 
Accordingly, a proclamation which was issued by the TGE established fourteen 
regions were delimited.131 Forty eight ethnic groups, out of the identified sixty 
four, were allowed to establish their own transitional self government at local and 
regional level.132  The rest of the ethnic groups were designated as minorities. The 
minorities had no right to establish their own government at local level. But they 
had the right to representation at the local councils.133 In this way the Charter put 
an end to the centralist governance system of the previous regimes and laid down 
the foundation for the ethnic federal structure of the country. 
3.3.1 Decentralisation under the federal system of Ethiopia 
In 1995 a new Constitution was promulgated which formally established the 
country as a federal state. The Ethiopian federation was composed of nine 
ethnically defined regional states and two autonomous cities. The regional states 
are Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, 
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Harari, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ (SNNPR) regions. Addis 
Ababa and Dire Dawa were structured as autonomous cities.134  
The place and status of local government in the federal system of Ethiopia was 
under debate at the drafting stage of the 1995 Constitution. There were two views 
regarding the place of local government at that stage. The first view was that the 
matter regarding local government should be regulated in the federal 
Constitution. 135    It was argued that unless the status of local government is 
regulated in the federal Constitution, the states will not be willing to devolve 
sufficient powers and resources to local level.136 The opposite view was that the 
place of local government should be left to the states. The argument that 
forwarded in this regard was that as in each state there are diverse interests which 
need to be addressed in different ways, it was better to regulate the matter through 
state constitutions by taking into account the special situations prevailing in each 
state.137    
Finally a compromise was reached. It was agreed that local matters should be 
regulated in the states constitutions. However the states were constitutionally 
required to transfer adequate power to local level.138 The Constitution, in addition 
stipulated that“[e]very Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to 
a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish 
institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable 
representation in state and Federal governments”.139  Therefore ethnic related 
questions which were not answered through regional state formation were to be 
addressed through the establishment of local government. 
 Accordingly, in 1995, a number of regional states transferred powers to local 
level through their constitutions. The major devolution of power to local level 
took place in 2001. The Amhara, Tigray. Oromia and SNPP regions, in particular, 
transferred more power to local level through their revised constitutions. The four 
regions established woreda and kebele administrations below the regional 
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administration.140 In effect, in a geographical area which is inhabited by one 
hundred thousand and more people a woreda is established. Each woreda is also 
divided into a number of kebeles. Nationality administrations in Amhara region 
and zone and special woreda in SNNPR are also established for the minority 
ethnic groups in the regions based on their settlement power.141   
It is not clear what factors influenced the furtherance of decentralisation in these 
regions. However some reasonable conjectures can be made. The first factor, 
therefore, is the influence of donors, particularly the World Bank. The Bank has 
urged and provided financial and technical assistances for the furtherance of 
decentralisation in these regions. It follows up the working of woredas in the four 
regions.142 Therefore the influence of the Bank behind the strengthened effort of 
decentralisation in the four regions cannot be gainsaid. The fact that these regions 
are in a better position regarding institutional capacity and personnel skill than the 
other regions143 might be the other factor behind the strengthened effort of 
decentralisation in these states. These factors might have encouraged the 
decentralisation process in these regional states. 
Summary 
Throughout the last century Ethiopia evolved to become one of highly centralised 
states in the world. The process of centralisation reached its apex during the Derg 
government. With the removal of the Derg government and the transfer of power 
to regional level, however, the first step in introducing a decentralised system of 
governance took place. With the federalisation of the country the constitutional 
foundation for a more decentralised system of governance is laid. Presently, 
through regional constitution, the process of entrenching decentralised system of 
governance is underway.                               
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                                         Chapter 4 
                     The rationales for the decentralisation in Ethiopia  
4.1 Introduction 
The historical factors leading to the present decentrlisation process in Ethiopia 
have been briefly traversed in the previous chapter. It is critical to discuss the 
rationales behind the effort to decentralise power before dealing with the 
decentralisation programme in four regional states under consideration; namely 
Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNPR. Therefore, in this part of the study, the 
poverty reduction and developmental, democratic and ethnic related rationales of 
the process of decentralisation in country will be discussed. 
4.2 Poverty Reduction and Developmental Rationale 
4.2.1. Poverty in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is also one of the most impoverished states in the world. According to a 
UNDP report, 45.9 % of the people live below national poverty line.144 Its 
infrastructures and distribution of clean water, health care and other services are 
poor even compared to other low income countries.145 The same is true with other 
social indicators such as life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment and 
gender equality.146 On the other hand the population is growing at an alarming 
rate. The population which was 63 million in 2001 is now estimated at 75 
million.147  
This impoverished state of the country is attributed to the centuries’ long feudal 
system and the seventeen years civil war which followed with the coming to 
power of Derg.148 The total dependence on rain-fed agriculture has exposed the 
population to constant production and market uncertainties. A Chronic episode of 
drought has caused and is causing untold suffering to the people of the country. 
The wars that the country battled with Somalia and Eritrea also have contributed 
as impediment against developmental efforts. 
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4.2.2. Sustainable development and poverty reduction programme 
 The aforementioned state of the country forced the current government of the 
country to make poverty reduction and development its primary policy goals.149 
Accordingly, it has declared poverty reduction as its core goal which it aspires to 
achieve. The principal means which the government has chosen to achieve this 
goal is economic growth.150With this view, the government launched a program 
known as “Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme”. The 
overall objective of this programme is to reduce poverty while at the same time 
maintaining balanced macro-economy.151 To that effect, the medium 
macroeconomic strategies of the program are directed at “reorienting the 
budgetary resources towards poverty reducing sectors”.152 The specific objective 
in the medium strategy is to achieve a 7 percent annual GDP growth.153 
Maintaining equitable growth was also at the heart of the programme.154 This is 
directed at reducing the gap in development among the regions. The SDPRP is 
also linked to and directed at achieving the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) which aims at, among other things, reducing extreme poverty and hunger 
by half by 2015.155 The government hopes through SDPRP to achieve a minimum 
of five percent annual economic growth so that it can be able to reduce poverty in 
half by 2015.156  
4.2.3. Decentralisation as a means of poverty reduction  
The strategy to reduce poverty is “built on four pillars.” one of which is 
decentralisation.157 Accordingly, government has launched what is called a 
District Level Decentralisation Program (DLP). According to this programme, the 
government has adopted a policy to make local districts (woredas) to be the 
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center of social and economic development.158  It also intends to involve the 
people in its development programme at district level.159   
 
Through decentralisation the government aims to address the diverse service 
delivery need of the people.  Majority of the Ethiopian people live in the highland 
areas while the rest of the people live in low land areas.160  This diverse 
settlement pattern of the people has resulted in a diverse social and economic 
dynamics.161 “From settled upland teff cultures of the north to the enset-based 
farming system of South to a range of agro pastoralists and nomadic system along 
the margins of the Rift Valley, each with their own particular socio-economic 
dynamics”162  The diverse settlement pattern and the divers socio-economic 
dynamics have made the services which are needed by the people varied.163 For 
instance the kinds of services which are needed by the people in the northern part 
of the country include fertilisers and seeds delivery. Conversely the people in the 
low land area are pastoralists. Therefore, veterinary services for their cattle and, 
as the parents move from place to place with their cattle, boarding schools for 
their children are among the services which are most needed by them.  
Decentralised form service delivery is therefore found to be the logical solution 
necessitating decentralised form of governance. 
4.3 Democratisation and public participation  
The other rationale behind the decentralisation process is democratisation and 
empowerment of the people.164 The democratisation rationale is mainly 
articulated within the framework of development and poverty reduction 
rationale.165 This is based on an apparent conviction from the part of the 
government that the success of any development endeavor depends on the 
participation of the people.166 In addition it is seen as a way to allow the people to 
exercise their right under the FDRE Constitution to participate in developmental 
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activities and projects that will affect their lives.167 By shifting decision making 
power from the center to district level, therefore, the government aspires to 
empower the local community, in particular the poor, to take part in and enjoy the 
full advantage of developmental activities.168 Furthermore, it aims to enable the 
local community to ‘participate, negotiate and influence’ the decision making 
processes concerning local matters. In addition it aims to create system which 
allows the local people to control the local authorities and hold them 
accountable.169 
 
Decentralising power at district level is, therefore, is seen as a means to ensure 
that that the people can meaningfully participate in government. As part of the 
democratisation effort, empowering women and maintaining gender equality is 
also given emphasis.170 
4.4 Ethnic related rationale    
Ethiopia has ethnically plural society. The plurality of the people is expressed in 
their diverse languages, culture, religion, settlement patterns and economic 
activities. To accommodate the diversity of the people within the country ethnic 
based federalism is chosen and is implemented.171 Accordingly the regional states 
are established by taking into account the settlement patterns of the different 
nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. However within these regional 
states a number of other ethnic minorities reside. 
 
Affording some measure of self-governance to these ethnic minorities was found 
to be crucial. Accommodation of diversity within the country has thus influenced 
the decentralisation process.172 Therefore allowing ethnic minorities to administer 
themselves was taken into consideration in the decentralisation process 
Preventing and managing ethnic conflict is one of the rationales behind the 
progressing effort of decentralisation.173    
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4.5 Summary 
The effort in Ethiopia to decentralise power at local level has three main 
rationales. Theses rationales are poverty reduction and development, 
democratisation and ethnic related rationales. Decentralisation is one of the four 
building blocks of the poverty reduction and sustainable development program 
which has been launched by the government of the country. Through 
decentralisation the government has planned to foster a democratic system and to 
mpower the poor and women. In addition the decentralised system is believed 
will help manage and mitigate ethnic clashes in the country. 
 
Chapter 5 
Decentralisation in the Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and SNNRP Regional 
States 
5.1 Introduction 
As was indicated in chapter 1, this study aims to inquire whether the regional 
states have transferred adequate power to local government.  With that view in 
the previous chapter a background on the decentralisation process in Ethiopia and 
its policy rational and constitutional foundation were discussed. The trend to 
adequately empower local government in Ethiopia will be examined based on the 
local governance system of four regional states in Ethiopia. These are Amhara, 
Oromia, Tigray and SNNPR. In this part of the study, therefore, the local 
governance system of each of these regional states will be described. 
5.2 The Amhara and Tigray National Regional States 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The Amhara and Tigray national regional states are found in the north western 
and northern most part of Ethiopia respectively. With an estimated area of 
161,828 square kilometer, the Amhara region is the second largest state in 
Ethiopia. The state has an estimated population of 17, 214 056.174 Around 92.1 
percent of the people in the state belong to the Amhara ethnic group. There are 
also Oromo, Himra and Awi ethnic groups in the state.175 Tigray regional state 
has estimated total population of 3,901 000.176  The Tigray people make 97 
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percent of the total population in the region. There are also Amhara, Irob and 
Kunama ethnic groups in the region.177 
 
5.2.2. Structural Organisation of the Regional States 
The revised constitutions of the Amhara and the Tigray regional states provide 
that the administrations of the regional states are structured at regional, woreda 
and kebele level.178  
 
5.2.2.1. The State/Regional Administration 
The state administration is the highest political authority in the two regions. It has 
three principal organs. These are a Regional/ State Council (RC), a Regional 
Administrative Council (RAC) and a judicial body.179 The RC is the legislative 
organ of the state governments. It comprises of elected representatives of the 
peoples of the two regions.180 The RAC is an executive organ of the state 
government. It consists of the regional chief administrator, his deputy and heads 
of other executive bureaus.181 The state administration also has a judicial organ. 
The state governments have a number of powers and functions which are 
devolved to them by the federal Constitution.182  
5.2.2.2. Local Government in Tigray and Amhara Regions 
As was indicated earlier, below the regional administration, woreda and kebele 
administrations are established in the two regions. Yet woreda is seen as the  
important local government unit while a kebele is simply an implementing agent 
of the woreda. A  woreda is established on a geographical area in which 100,000 
more people reside. 
 
There are a number of towns and cities in the two regions. These urban centers, as 
it will be discussed in some length below, have their own councils.183  In addition 
the ethnic minorities which reside in the Amhara region are entitled to their own 
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councils.184 Thus, as will be discussed below, the regional government has 
established ethnic based local units to the Oromo, Awi and Himra ethnic groups 
which are regarded as indigenous ehtnic groups of the Amhara regional state. 
Those in the Tigray region, however, are only entitled to be represented in the 
regional and local governments.185  
5.2.2.3. Organs of woreda administration 
As briefly indicated above, in the two regional states woreda administration has 
been established. The Woreda Administration (WA) in both the regions has three 
principal organs. These are the Woreda Council (WC), the Woreda 
Administrative Council (WAC) and the Woreda Court with first instance 
jurisdiction.186 The Woreda Court, even thought, it functions at woreda level, it is 
not part of the woreda administration.187 Therefore, in this study only the WC and 
WAC will be dealt with. 
5.2.2.4 Woreda council 
WC is the highest political organ woreda level in both Amhara and Tigray 
regions.188 Members of the WC in both regions are directly elected by the 
residents of a woreda. Members of a WC serve for a five year term.189 Members 
of the WC are accountable to the people who elected them.190  
 
A WC has speaker and deputy speaker who convene and preside over its 
proceedings.191 A WC convenes once in every three months.192 However, the 
speaker may call an extra-ordinary session anytime when the WC is not due to 
undertake its regular meeting.193 Under the Amhara regional state constitution, 
the speaker has an obligation to call an extra ordinary meeting if such meeting is 
demanded either by the woreda chief administrator (CA) or by more than half of 
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the members of the WC.194 However, in Tigray region only the members of the 
WC can request an extra-ordinary session.195  
5.2.2.5. Powers and functions of the woreda council  
The constitutions of the two states provide that a woreda has the authority to plan 
and implement its own economic development and social services programs. It 
also has the duty to implement the policies and laws of the federal and state 
governments.196 Matters of social services and economic development which are 
within the competences of woredas, however, are not clearly defined in the 
regional constitutions. 
 
 A WC is a legislative branch of the WA. As part of its legislative power a, WC 
has the authority to issue directives to ensure peace and security in the woreda.197 
It is also authorised to approve the budget of the woreda.198 Upon 
recommendation by the WAC, it has the power to approve the sources of revenue 
which the WA can make use of from those sources which are not allocated and 
administered by the regional government.199 It can also impose other service 
charges.200 In addition it has the power to examine and approve economic 
development, social service and administrative working plans of the woreda 
which are prepared by the WAC.201  
5.2.2.6. The Woreda executive council  
A woreda executive council (WEC) is an executive body in a woreda.202 It 
comprises of the CA, his deputy and heads of the principal sectoral offices in the 
woreda. The CA is elected by the WC from among its members upon the 
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nomination by the political party with the majority of seats in the WC.203 The 
deputy chief administrator (DCA) and the other members of the WAC are 
nominated by the CA and appointed by the WC. Thus, the WAC is composed of 
both elected and appointed officials. The WAC is chaired and represented by the 
CA.204  Under the Amhara Regional Constitution; the WAC is accountable to the 
WC and the state administration.205 However WACs which are found in 
Nationality Areas206 are not accountable to the regional administration.  Under the 
Tigray State Constitution WAC is accountable to the WC and to the CA.207  
5.2.2.7. The Powers and Functions of WEC 
The WAC/WEC has the power and duty to enforce the policy, legislation, 
directives, plans and programms of the federal and the regional governments.208 It 
also has the power to coordinate and supervise the different executive offices in 
of the woreda.209 The WEC is, in addition, responsible for preparing the annual 
budget and submitting it for approval to the WC.210 Furthermore, it is responsible 
for the collection of rural land use fees, agricultural income taxes and other 
revenues.211 It is also required to recommend additional sources of revenue other 
than those which are administered by the state governments and seeks the 
approval of the WC.212    
 
The WEC has the responsibility to prepare social services, economic 
development and administrative plans to WC.213 Upon approval by the WC, it 
implements the plan.214 It maintains peace and security in the woreda.215 To that 
effect, it has the power to direct and supervise security and police organs in the 
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woreda.216 It is also part of the respossiblities of a WEC to ensure the 
participation of the people in developmental activities.217 It has has also a duty to 
protect natural resources and heritages in a woreda.218 In addition to the 
aforementioned duties and powers, the WEC may be given additional 
responsibilities by the regional governments and the WC. 219 
5.2.2.8 Woreda chief administrator 
The CA is the head of the WEC.220 As the head of WEC, therefore, the CA has 
special responsibility to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the social 
services and economic development programs of the woreda.221 It is also the 
responsibility the CA to ensure the implementation of the policies, legislation and 
directives of the national and the regional governments.222 Furthermore, he is 
charged with coordinating of the kebeles in the woreda and supervising of the 
woreda police forces are parts of the responsibilities of the CA.223 Additionally, 
the CA discharges other responsibilities that may be given to him/her by the 
President of the regional states and by the WC as well.224 
5.2.3 Nationality zones in the Amhara Regional State 
5.2.3.1. Introduction 
As briefly stated above, in the Amhara regional state, there are three indignous 
ethnic minorities which are found concentrated in certain geographical areas 
within the region. The Regional Constitution recognises the right to self-
determination and self-government of these ethnic minorities.225 In effect, the 
Constitution designates a geographical area which is inhabited by an ethnic 
minority as “Nationality Zone”.226 It also requires the establishment of 
government institution in these areas. Accordingly, the three ethnic minorities in 
the region i.e. the Himra, Awi and Oromo ethnic minorities have their own 
nationality zones.227  
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Nationality zone has three principal organs. The organs are legislative council 
called nationality council (NC)228 and an executive council known as nationality 
executive council (NEC).229  
5.2.3.2. Nationality Council 
A NC is comprised of especially elected members of the WCs of the woredas 
which are found within the NAs. The members of the WC within the nationality 
zone elect from among themselves those who will be the members of the NC. In 
addition, those who are elected from a nationality zones to be members of the 
regional council automatically become the members of the NC.230  The Members 
of the NC serve for a term of five years.231  
5.2.3.3. Power and Functions of the NC 
The NC, next to the House of People’s Representatives232 and the Regional 
Council, is viewed as the highest political organ of the ethnic group 
concerned.233Under the Amhara Regional Constitution, the NC has certain 
powers and functions. It has the power to determine the working language of the 
organs of the Nationality Administration.234 It has the responsibility to protect the 
rights of the members of the ethnic group concerned to speak and write in their 
language.235 In addition it has the duty to protect the rights of the members of the 
ethnic minority to preserve, develop and promote their language and history.236 
 
Furthermore, the NC has the power to issue laws for the nationality zones.237 Yet, 
the laws which are issued by the NC have to be in conformity with the laws 
enacted by the state and federal government.238 The NC has the power to approve 
the budget of the nationality zones.239 However, as it will be shown, the a 
nationality zone is almost totally dependent on the intergovernmental grants from 
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the state government.240 Therefore, in adopting the budget NA, the NC has to take 
into account what is allocated to the NA by the regional government.241  
5.2.3.4 Nationality zone executive council 
A nationality zone executive council is comprised of a chief administrator (CA), a 
his deputy, and heads of other executive organs of the nationality zone.242 The 
executive council has parliamentarian form. Hence, the CA is elected from 
among the members of the NC following a proposal by a political party which has 
the majority of the seats in the NC.243 The other members of the administration 
are nominated by the CA and appointed upon approval by the NC.244 The NAC is 
accountable to the NC and the CA of the natioanltiy zone.245 In addition it is also 
accountable to the Regional Council and the President of the regional state.246 
5.2.3.5 Powers and Functions of the NAC 
The executive council is entrusted with several responsibilities. As the executive 
body, it has the duty to ensure the implementation of the laws and decisions of the 
federal, the regional governments as well as the legislative council of the 
nationality zone.247 It is also authorised to determine the organisation of the 
departments and other executive bodies of the nationality zone.248 Furthermore, it 
has the power to formulate the social, economic and developmental policies and 
strategies of the nationality administration.249 In addition, it is responsible for the 
preparation and implementation of the budget of the Nationality Administration. 
However, matters of social services and economic development which are within 
the competences of a nationality zone are not clearly defines in the regional 
Constitution. 250  
5.2.3.6. Nationality Chief Administrator 
The CA is the head of the executive council and the representative of the 
nationality zone.251 As head of the executive council, the CA has special 
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responsibility to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the social and 
economic programs of the nationality zone as well as the policies, legislation and 
directives of the national and the regional governments. In addition he discharges 
other responsibilities that may be given to him by the President of the regional 
state and by the NC.252 
5.2.4 Kebele administration 
Kebele administration is the lowest administrative unit  the Amhara and Tigray 
regional states.253 A kebele is a subdivision of a woreda in which around 
approximately 10,000 people reside. Kebele administration comprises kebele 
council, kebele administrative council and social court.254 The kebele council is 
composed of elected reoresentatives.255 According to the constitutions of the two 
regions, a kebele administration has a sole authority on the social services and 
economic development of the kebele.256 However, matters of social services and 
economic development which are within the competences of the kebele are not 
clearly provided in the state constitutions of the two regions.  
 
The kebele administrative council is constituted by the chief administrator, who is 
elected by the kebele council from among its members, and other members.257 
The kebele administrative council is the lowest executive body in the hierarchy of 
the regional administration. Albeit at lower level, KAC has similar tasks with the 
WAC.258     
5.3 Local Governance in the Oromia Regional State 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The Oromia regional state, with 359,619.8 square kilometer area, is the largest 
state in Ethiopia.259 It constitutes around 30% of the country’s total area. The 
regional state is contiguous with all but the Tigray regional state.260 
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It is also the most populous region in the country. The population in the region is 
estimated around 27, 158,471.261 Around 87 percent of the people in the regional 
state are Oromo.  A number of other ethnic minorities also reside in the region.262  
5.3.2 Structural Organisation of the Regional State’s Government 
Government in the Oromia regional state is organised at regional, zonal, woreda 
and kebele level. 263 As the Tigray and Amhara regions, the Oromia regional 
administration has a Regional Council, a Regional Administrative Council and a 
judicial body. The organisation, powers and functions of these organs is similar 
with their counterpart in the Amhara and Tigray regions.  
 
The region is divided into 14 zones and 199 woredas. Each woreda is also 
divided into a number of kebeles. As shall be shown below, the zone 
administration is the representative of the regional government at zone level.264 
Therefore the regional state can be said to have only two-tiered local governance 
system. 
5.3.2.1 Zone administration 
Zone administration (ZA) is an executive body which is organised below the 
regional administration at zonal level.265 It holds a number of woredas in it.266 ZA 
does not have elected council. It is not also a distinct level of government as the 
woredas. Therefore the power transfer from the regional government to the ZA 
can be said to have taken the form deconcentration rather than devolution. 
 
 The ZA is run by a CA and his deputy.267 The CA is nominated by the regional 
president and appointed by the regional council. The CA is also the representative 
of the regional President at zone level and is accountable to him.268 
 
Zone administration has the responsibility to coordinate, support and follow up 
the effective functioning of the woredas, other departments and institutions in the 
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zone.269 It is also the duty of the zone administration to coordinate those 
institutions which provide service in more than one woreda.270 In addition, it has 
the responsibility to ensure the implementation of polices, legislation and 
decisions of the regional government in the woredas in the zone.271 
5.3.2.2. Woreda and kebele in Oromia region 
The Woreda Administration in the Oromia regional state has a WC and a 
WAC.272 Under the Regional Constitution of Oromia, a WC, a WAC and a kebele 
administration have similar organisation, functions and powers with their 
counterparts in the Amhara and Tigray regional states.273 This renders the detailed 
discussion of woreda and kebele administration in the Oromia region superfluous.   
5.4 Local Governance in the SNNPR 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The SNNPR is found in the southern part of Ethiopia. It borders Kenya in south, 
Ilemi triangle in south west, the Gambella regional state in the north-west, and the 
Oromia regional state in the north and east. The region comprises 112,323.19 
square kilometer area.274 The total population is estimated around 14, 901 900.275 
The region is a home for more than 45 indigenous ethnic groups.276  
5.4.2. Structure of the government 
The state government is organised at region, zones, special woredas, woredas, 
and kebels levels.277 The structural organisation, the powers and functions of the 
regional government is identical with its counterpart in the regions discussed 
above. The region has 9 zones, 5 special woredas, 72 woredas and each woreda 
and special woreda is divided into a number of kebels.  
5.4.2.1. Nationality zone and special Woreda 
The SNNPR constitution provides that the nations and nationalities in the region 
will have their own zonal or special woreda administration.278 The ethnic groups 
with a large population settling on a large geographical area are allowed to have a 
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zonal administration while those with smaller population size are entitled to 
special woreda. Thus, ethnic groups with large population size such as Sidama, 
Gurage, Hadiya, Gedeo and the like have their own nationality zones. Ethnic 
groups with smaller population size such as Burji, Amaro, Dirashe, Konso and 
Yem have special woredas. The zones or the special woredas are delimited based 
on the settlement pattern, language, identities and consent of the people.279  
 
Nationality zone or special woreda is second in the administrative hierarchy of 
the region.280 The regional constitution provides that a zone and a special woreda 
have three principal organs. These are a zonal or special woreda council 
(Z/SWC), a zonal or special woreda administrative council (Z/SWAC) and a 
judiciary.281  
5.4.2.2. Zonal or Special Woreda Council (Z/SWC)  
The Z/SWC is the highest political organ at zone or special woreda level. It is 
constituted by representatives who are elected to Z/SWC. 282 In addition those 
who are elected to State Council from a zone or SW are members of the 
Z/SWC.283  
5.4.2.3. Power and Functions of Z/SWC 
The Constitution of the region provides Z/SWC shall exercise the highest 
political authority next to the House of Peoples Representatives and the State 
Council in a zone.284 Accordingly, the ZSWC has the power to determine the 
working language of the zone or the special woreda.285 It has a duty to protect the 
rights of the members of the nation or nationality concerned to write, speak and to 
develop their language.286  
 
The Z/SWC has a “plenary” power to legislate on matters which are not covered 
by state laws and to publish its legislation in the Debub Negarit Gazette.287 
However such legislation may not be inconsistent with the state and federal 
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laws.288 The Z/SWC has the authority to approve its own budget based on what is 
allocated to it by the State Council.289   
5.4.2.4. Zonal or Special woreda administrative council  
Z/SWAC is the executive body of the zonal or special woreda administration. It is 
constituted by a CA, a DCA and heads of other executive organs.290 
5.4 2.5 Powers and functions of the Z/SWAC 
Z/SWAC, as the executive organ Z/SWA, is responsible for ensuring the 
implementation and observance of the state and federal laws and the decisions of 
Z/SWC.291 In addition it has the responsibility to prepare the budget, to formulate 
the policies and strategies for the zone or the special woreda consistent with the 
state policies and strategies and implements them upon approval by the Z/SWC. 
It also performs other duties as it may be entrusted to it by the Z/SWC and 
Executive Council of the regional government.292 
 
The Z/SWAC is chaired, coordinated and represented by the CA.293  The CA, as 
the head of the Z/SWAC has the power to direct and control the executive organs 
and other “sub-ordinate” organs and security and police forces.294 
5.4.2.5 The woreda and kebele administration in SNNPR 
The WA stands next to zonal administration in the hierarchy of the regional 
administration.295 It comprises a WC, a WAC and Courts.296 The regional 
constitution provides that the WA has the definitive authority to prepare 
determine and implement plans of social services and economic development.297 
The kebele administration is the lowest administrative body in the SNNPR.298 The 
structural organisation, powers and functions of both the woreda administration 
and kebele administration are identical to their counterparts in the regions 
discussed above.299 
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5.5 Urban administrations 
The Amhara State Constitution provides, as was mentioned earlier, that cities and 
urban centers may have their own council.300 However it does not clearly regulate 
the structural organisation, powers and functions of the urban centers. The 
constitutions of the other three regional states speak of urban administrations only 
indirectly.301  
 
However each of the four regions has recently issued a proclamation in which 
they defined the structure, powers, functions and duties of urban centers.302 They 
have adopted a Council-Mayor system to the urban centers in the regions. Thus 
each urban administration in the regions has a Council, a Mayor’s Committee 
which is an executive body and a Mayor.  Furthermore, the urban centers have 
professional city managers who are elected based on their merits. Yet, in the 
states under consideration, with the exception of some towns and cities, the great 
majority of urban and semi-urban centers do not have their own elected councils. 
In many instances these urban centers are put under the supervision of woreda 
administration. Urban service and development are thereby demoted to 
“secondary level”303 
 
 In practice, however, the urban centers play an important role in the area of 
education, health trade and industry as agents of the regional states. The urban 
centers also discharge function such as waste collection, sewerage, street 
lightning and the like.304 
5.6. Local government finance in the four regional states 
As was briefly alluded to in the previous sections, woreda administrations in all 
the four regional states have the power to collect certain taxes. A woreda 
administration collects rural land use fees and agricultural income taxes. It also 
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imposes and collects service charges.305 The rate of the rural land use fees and 
agricultural income taxes is determined by the regional government.306 
Furthermore, the woreda administration has the power to make use of any 
revenue source within the woreda which is not administered by the regional 
governments.307 That means, from the sources of revenue which the federal 
Constitutions has allocated to the states, if there is any source of revenue which is 
not used by the states, the woredas can make use of  it.308 
 
Nevertheless, woredas are not at liberty to spend the revenue they collect. The 
revenue is transferred to the treasury of the state governments.309 As was 
mentioned above, the state constitutions of the four regions provide that from the 
sources of revenue which are constitutionally assigned to the states, woredas can 
make use of the revenue sources that are not administered by the regional 
governments.310 However, the states are administering and making use of all the 
sources of revenue under their jurisdiction. This means, the woredas are not given 
any significant internal sources of revenue.  
5.6.1 Intergovernmental grants 
The federal government has a scheme of intergovernmental revenue transfer 
which is known as a “block grants”.311 Through this scheme it transfers a 
considerable amount of money to the regional states. The grant is transferred 
according to a prearranged formula and it has no or minimum conditions attached 
to it.312  
 
However woredas and zones do not receive intergovernmental grants directly 
from the federal government. Instead, revenues are transferred to them by the 
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regional governments.  The intergovernmental grant that woredas and zones 
obtain from the regional governments also takes the form of a “block grant”.313 
Therefore they get the grants from the regional government without conditions 
attached. The variables which are used to determine the grant are: population size 
(55 %), level of poverty (10%), expenditure needs (20%), revenue raising 
capacity and execution efficiency (15%).314 Woredas and zones have full liberty 
as to how to spend the revenue which they receive in form of block grants. 
5.6.2 Borrowing 
The FDRE Constitution provides that regional states may borrow money from 
internal sources.315 They are authorised to borrow money under terms and 
conditions that the federal government determines by law.316 However there is 
nothing provided either in the federal or Constitutions regarding whether local 
government can borrow money.  
5.7. Administrative power 
As was seen above, woreda administration is authorised to run its own 
administration. Thus it has the power to hire and fire personnel. A shortage of 
skilled man power at woreda level is said to be one of the most critical problems 
of the local governance system in the four regional states.317 With a view to 
address this problem skilled man-power is transferred from regions and zones at 
woreda level in the four regional states.318  
5.8 Supervision 
 There are provisions in the federal and the states constitutions which give some 
indication about the general regulatory roles of the federal and the state 
governments. The FDRE Constitution provides that the federal government has 
the power to establish and implement national standards and basic policy criteria 
in certain areas. 319 For instance, it sets standards in the area of public health, 
education, science and technology as well as for the protection and preservation 
of cultural and historical legacies.320 The Constitution also provides that states 
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will issue laws regarding state civil servants and their working conditions which 
are approximate to the national standards.321 The regional constitutions, similarly, 
provide that the NC (in Amhara) and Z/SWC (SNNPR) and WC should exercise 
their legislative power in line with federal and state laws.322  Such standards and 
rules which are set by the national and state laws, to the extent they are relevant 
to local government can be construed as acts of regulation within the meaning of 
supervision. 
 
 Nonetheless, the legislative power of the states does not seem to be limited to 
regulating the woreda, the zone and the nationality administrations’ legislative 
powers. As was discussed in the preceding chapter, the federal Constitution has 
divided powers and functions between the federal and the state governments.323 
The Constitution left it for the states to decide, from the powers allocated to them, 
which powers and functions to devolve to local governments; provided that the 
powers and function devolved to local level are adequate.324 As mentioned 
earlier, the state constitutions afford WC, NC and Z/SWC legislative powers 
which are to be exercised in line with state and federal laws. Supposedly, the 
legislative power of the states on woredas, zones and nationality area should have 
certain limits. 
 
However, firstly, as will be argued in the next chapter, there is no clear distinction 
between the states and local government matters. Secondly whatever functional 
competences local government may have, they lack exclusivity. That is, the 
extent to which the states can exercise legislative powers on local government 
matters, if there any such matter, is not clear. What is clear is that the local 
government cannot enact contrary to the proclamations enacted by the states. In 
contrast, the constitutions do not preclude the states from legislating on local 
matters. Given the limitless legislative power of the states on the state matters, the 
laws enacted by WC, NC and Z/SWC will stay in force only temporarily. If the 
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state governments issue proclamations that contradict the legislation of the NC or 
the Z/SWC, the legislation of the NC and Z/SWC will automatically lose effect.  
 
Under the state constitutions there is no clearly stipulated procedure according to 
which the state governments can assess local government.  In addition there is no 
clear procedure of intervention by states when a local administration fails to 
discharge its responsibilities. However, zones and nationality administrations 
have the responsibility of coordinating the works of woredas within them. 
Furthermore, in practice, the Federal Ministry of Capacity Building and state 
capacity building offices assess the performance of the woredas. They also extend 
assistance to the woredas, for instance, through skilled staff decentralisation.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter, the local governance systems of the Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and 
SNNP regional state was discussed. The structural organisation, functions and 
powers of local government in these regions were dealt with in detail. It was also 
discussed that in the four regions woreda and kebele administrations are 
established as distinct units of government. In the Amhara and SNNP, in addition 
with the view to allowing the ethnic groups in the regions to exercise their right to 
self governance, government institutions such as nationality, zonal and special 
woreda administrations are established.    
 
Chapter Six 
Assessment conclusion and recommendations 
6.1. Introduction 
In the second chapter the criteria were laid down against which the adequacy of 
the empowerment of local government in Ethiopia is to be gauged. 
Democratically elected authorities, exclusive functional competences, and self-
administration of ethnic minorities were set as criteria. The preceding chapter 
dealt with the structural organisation, powers, functions and financial sources of 
local government in the four regional states of Ethiopia. In this chapter, therefore, 
against the backdrop of the criteria set in chapter two, the trend in adequately 
empowering of local government in Ethiopia will be assessed. In addition a 
conclusion and recommendations will be put forward. 
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6.2 Assessing the form of decentralisation adopted in Ethiopia 
In the opening chapter the different forms of decentralisation were canvassed. 
Delegation, deconcentration and devolution were described and their distinctive 
features were elucidated.325 With regard to devolution it was held that it is a form 
of decentralisation in which local government is constituted legally as a separate 
and autonomous governance body. In addition it was stated that in such form of 
decentralisation, powers and functions are transferred from the center to local 
government permanently through constitutional or legal means.  
 
The federal Constitution enjoins the states to establish local government units and 
to transfer adequate powers to them.326  Consequently, as it was seen in the last 
chapter, zones (in SNNPR), nationality areas (in Amhara), woredas and kebeles 
are constituted as separate units by the constitutions of the states. The 
constitutions of the states recognise the woreda and zone (SNNPR) and 
nationality administrations (Amhara) as the highest political bodies at their 
respective level.327 In addition they provide that the woreda administration shall 
have such powers, and functions which are necessary to plan and effect social 
services and economic development programs. Therefore, from the above, it can 
be deduced that the form of decentralisation which is adopted in Ethiopia is 
devolution. 
 6.3. Decentralisation and democratisation 
 One of the criteria set to measure the adequacy of the empowerment of local 
government was its democratic character. As was stated previously, democratic 
local government has authorities which are directly elected by the residents of the 
locality rather than appointed by the central government.328 The administrative 
personnel is hired and fired by the local government without interference from the 
center. In addition a democratic local governance system is participatory.329 Thus 
it creates a favourable condition in which decisions concerning the locality are 
passed after the voices of the residents of the locality are heard and taken into 
account. 
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The constitutional framework of the local governance system of the four states in 
Ethiopia envisages such democratic features. As was pointed out in the previous 
chapter, authorities of zones (SNNPR), nationality administrations (Amhara), 
woredas and kebeles administrations are constituted by officials elected, directly 
or indirectly, by the local people. With regard to the public participation 
requirement, the federal Constitution unequivocally requires local government to 
be participatory.330 Furthermore, the regional states constitutions put an 
obligation on the organs of local administrations to create conditions which are 
favourable for participatory decision making process. This enables the local 
people to take part in the decisions of the local government. The constitutions 
also establish that woreda, zonal and nationality zone officials are accountable to 
the people who elected them. The practical reality in the regions may be different. 
However, the examination of the regional constitutions reveals that there is a 
constitutional foundation for participatory, accountable and, therefore, democratic 
local government is laid in the four regions.  
6.4. Exclusive functional competences  
The other benchmark for measuring the adequacy of the empowerment of local 
government is related to its functional competences. It was indicated that local 
government should be provided, through constitutional means, with certain 
clearly stipulated functional competences.331 The functional competences should 
be, subject to framework legislation of the central government, exclusive to local 
government.332 Local government should have final say on those matters. In 
addition, apart from setting legislative frameworks and effecting supervisory 
functions, the central government should not interfere in the routines of local 
government and should respect its autonomy.333  
 
The federal Constitution of Ethiopia urges the states to transfer adequate power to 
local government. Consequently, the constitutions of the four states under 
consideration recognised zonal (SNNPR), nationality and woreda administrations 
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as the highest political authorities at their respective level.334 The constitutions 
also provided the woreda administration with the power to draft and implement 
its own plan regarding on matters of social services and economic 
development.335 Zones and special woredas in SNNPR and nationality 
administrations in Amhara region are also given the power to decide on certain 
matters with regard to the ethnic groups that they represent.336  
 
Nevertheless, the constitutions of the four regional states lack clarity on the 
functional competences of woredas. As was mentioned above woredas, and 
kebeles have the competence to draft and implement their own social, economic 
and administrative plan. However ‘social and economic development matters are 
very broad subjects. A wide range of matters fall under this catagory .  The 
regional constitutions do not plainly list, among the matters that can be 
considered as social and economic matters, the ones which are within the 
exclusive functional competences of woredas. 
 
The South African and Nigerian Constitutions may be referred to in order to 
clarify this issue. The Constitutions of the two countries have long lists of matters 
which may be referred to as matters of social service and economic development 
which are set aside as functional competences of local government.337 Among 
those which can be considered as matters of social service, the Nigerian 
Constitution for instance, provides registration of birth, death and marriage, 
establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds, schools, and the 
like as local government functions.338 From among those which can be considered 
as economic matters establishing and maintaining markets area within the 
functional competences of local government.339 Likewise, the South African 
Constitution has two lists of what may be considered either as social or economic 
matters. For instance, child care facilities, building regulation, local sport 
facilities and local tourism are within the functional competences of local 
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government.340 Conversely, it is absolutely unclear what social service and 
economic matter is the exclusive jurisdiction of woredas. 
.   
Clearly, stipulating the functional competences of woredas is essential and serves 
numerous purposes. It helps maintain the autonomy of woredas and avoid 
jurisdictional conflict with the state governments. It also helps woredas to foster 
democracy and development. This, in turn, will result in the fulfilment of the 
constitutional obligation of the states to provide local government with sufficient 
power. Otherwise, the quarterly gathering of elected woreda officials by itself 
will bring neither democracy nor development unless they have real and pertinent 
powers and functions.  
 
From different documents it can be gathered that, in practice, woredas exercise 
certain powers in the areas of primary health care, primary education, rural water 
supply and rural roads.341 Nevertheless, given the importance of these functions 
for development and democratisation, the content and limit of the competences of 
woredas in these areas should have been clearly provided in the constitutions. At 
present, whatever power woredas are exercising, this is not a result of a carefully 
contrived scheme of power division. Rather, it is a result of “political 
considerations”.342     
 
The relegation of the matters relating to urban centres to ordinary pieces of 
legislation is the other point which creates concern. One cannot gainsay the 
importance of urban centres for economic and democratic development. 
However, all the four regional states chose to deal with matters relating to urban 
centres in their proclamations. Three of them did not even mention urban centres 
in their constitution save indirectly. The majority of the urban centers do not have 
even their own councils. This might have emanated from the rustic and 
agriculture-centered policies of the ruling party.343 Given the importance of urban 
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centres for development and democratisation, it is submitted, the structure and 
functional competences of urban centres should have been constitutionally 
entrenched.   
The other matter pertains to the autonomy of the woredas. As was pointed out in 
the first chapter, in exercising their power and discharging their functions, local 
governments should be free of interference from the state governments. The role 
of the state governments should be restricted to supervision. 
 
In the previous chapter, it was indicated that the state constitutions require local 
governments to exercise their legislative power in conformity with federal and 
state laws. On the other hand the states are not required to exercise their 
legislative power only with the view to setting framework legislation on local 
matters. In effect they can regulate local matters, even though it is not clear what 
those matters are, through their legislation. Therefore, whatever functional 
competences local government may have, they are not exclusive to them.  
 
Furthermore, under the Amhara state constitution the woreda administrations are 
accountable not only to the woreda people but to the regional government. The 
woreda administrations in nationality areas have further accountability to the NC. 
It is not clear what their accountability to the state government and nationality 
administration entails. Therefore, it can be said that their autonomy is exposed to 
intrusion by the state and the nationality administration by way of holding the 
woreda administration accountable.  
 
In Oromia region zonal administration is established over a number of woredas. 
Zonal administration is run by persons appointed by the president of the regional 
government. As was discussed, zonal administration coordinates and supervises 
the woredas in the zone. While the intention appears to be benign, some studies 
show zonal administrations exercise control and constant interference on woreda 
administrations. Such control has become of great limitation on the autonomy of 
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woredas.344 In short a system of supervision which provides sufficient protection 
to the autonomy of the woredas is not provided for.  
6.5. Self administration of ethnic minorities 
The federal Constitution of Ethiopia provides that “[e]very Nation, Nationality 
and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which 
includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it 
inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments”.345 In 
accordance with this principle the nine regional states were established.346 Based 
on the same principle, two of the regional states through, their constitutions, have 
recognised the right to self-government of ethnic groups. As a result, the Amhara 
regional state has established nationality areas for the three ethnic minorities in 
the region. In addition it has established institution of government i.e. the NA to 
the ethnic groups. 
 
Likewise, in the SNNPR, zones and special woredas are established based on the 
settlement patterns of the nations and nationalities. The nations and nationalities 
in the region are afforded zonal and special woreda administration. Furthermore, 
the state constitutions provide that NA, special woredas and zone administrations 
are the highest political organs of the ethnic group concerned. 
 
 However a close perusal of the constitutions of the two regions reveals that the 
only real area of authority which is exclusive to these organs is determining the 
working language of the area, appointing certain officials and other related 
matters. Otherwise, these organs do not have any clear area of competences with 
regard to social services and economic development of the ethnic groups they 
represent. In particular, the distinction between the area of authority of the 
regional administration, the nationality or zonal administration and the woreda 
administrations in the nationality areas or zonal administration is fuzzy.  It is 
provided that they can issue laws on matters not covered by state laws. Yet any 
legislation that they may issue can be repealed by a subsequent and differing 
legislation of regional governments. They also do not have their own internal 
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revenue sources. Even though they have the power to prepare their own budget, 
they do so based on what is allocated to them by the state governments.  
 
In short the constitutional systems that exist in the four regional states do not 
allow the minority ethnic groups in the region to exercise their right to self-
government fully and effectively. 
 
6.6. Local finance  
It was indicated in chapter 2 that internal financial sources are critical to enable 
local government to effectively exercise its power and to discharge its duties.347 
In particular, the importance of providing local government with both revenue 
raising and spending power was discussed. 
 
As was shown in the preceding chapter, however, woredas hardly have any 
internal sources of revenue. Even if the state constitutions provide that woredas 
can make use of sources of revenues which are not administered by the state 
government, the states have retained almost all revenues sources which they are 
authorised to impose and collect under the federal Constitution. Woredas collect 
land use fees and agriculture income tax. However the proceeds are transferred to 
the state treasury. Taxes on private properties, which are usually considered as 
appropriate to local government, are retained by the states. In short no significant 
source of revenue is left to the woredas. Therefore they are almost totally 
dependent on the intergovernmental grant from the states governments. Special 
woredas and zones in SNNPR and Nationality Councils in Amhara region have 
the power to prepare and approve their own budget. Nevertheless they are given 
no power to raise revenue at all. Therefore, they are also totally dependent on 
intergovernmental grants from the state governments. 
 
It is not difficult to understand how such lack or internal revenue will adversely 
affect the implementation of social services and economic development activities 
by the woredas. Despite the fact that the intergovernmental grant is 
unconditional, it cannot be equated with internal revenue. The woredas do not 
                                                           
347
 See chapter 2  §2.6.4.  
 54 
 
have control over the amount of revenue that is transferred to them. They do not 
have the benefit of deciding on the amount of revenue they can raise in light of 
their plan. Rather they will be forced to limit their plan to the grant that they 
receive from the state government. 
 
The other matter which raises concern is that under the state constitutions, the 
states retain the power to transfer certain duties to be discharged by woreda 
administrations. Nonetheless, it is unclearly stipulated in the constitutions how 
the costs of discharging such duties are to be covered. This exposes the woredas 
to unfunded or underfunded mandate. This problem is not only theoretical. In 
fact, the issue of unfunded mandates has been one of the challenges that woreda 
administrations are facing.348 
 
Conclusion 
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Ethiopia directs the regional states to 
establish local governments and empower them adequately. It also recognises the 
rights of every nation, nationality and people in the country for self-governance. 
Accordingly the Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP regional states, through 
constitutional means, have established institutions of local administration at 
different levels.  
 
The rationales underpinning the system of local governance which is designed by 
these states are fostering democracy, enhancing development and promoting the 
right to self-governance of the nations and nationalities and peoples in the 
regions. To that effect, woreda and kebele administrations, constituted by elected 
officials, are established as distinct and autonomous governance bodies in each of 
the regional states. They are also empowered to plan and implement their own 
social services and economic development programs. Furthermore, zones and 
special woredas in SNNPR and nationality areas in Amhara regional state are 
established as a response to the right to self governance of nations and 
nationalities in the regional states.   
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Nevertheless, the areas of social services and economic development which are 
within the exclusive competences of woredas are not clearly spelled out in the 
constitutions of the states. Furthermore, the authority and functional relations 
between the state government and the woredas is not clearly spelled out. Such 
lack of clarity creates uncertainty about the content and scope of the authority of 
the local government. It also exposes the woredas to constant and undue 
interference from the regional administrations. Even if government institutions as 
NA, zones and special woredas are established with the view to enhancing the 
self-governance of minority ethnic groups, no real authority is devolved to them. 
Matters regarding urban centers are totally relegated to ordinary pieces of 
legislation. This undermines their role for democratisation and development.  
 
Furthermore, woredas suffer from a lack of internal sources of revenue. They are 
almost entirely dependent on the grants they receive from the regional states. This 
is likely to compromise the effective planning and implementation of 
development programs of the woredas.  
 
In sum, local government in the four regional states of the country is not 
sufficiently empowered. Seen in light of the local governance system of these 
regional states, the decentralisation process in the country does not show a trend 
of adequately empowering local government.    
 
Recommendations 
Based on the above assessments, the following recommendations are put forward. 
 
*There should be a clearly and systematically defined division of power between 
the state governments and woredas. To that effect, the functional competences of 
the woredas in the areas of social services and economic development should be 
clearly listed in the constitutions of the regional governments.  
 
* In addition to listing the functional competences of the woredas, the 
constitutions should restrict the competences of the state with regard to these 
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areas to the setting of frameworks. The constitutions should also clearly preclude 
the states from encroaching on woreda competences. 
 
*Matters with regard to urban centers should be regulated in the constitutions of 
the states. Thus, the structures, functional competences and financial sources of 
urban centers should be clearly provided in the states’ constitutions.   
 
*Woredas should be able to raise their own internal revenue. Thus the states 
should authorise them to impose and collect certain taxes. In addition they should 
establish a scheme in which the woredas share in the revenues they collect on 
behalf of the states. Furthermore, the states should be obligated to shoulder the 
financial responsibility when they transfer certain functions to woredas.   
 
*The states which have established government institutions for the ethnic 
minorities residing in them should provide these institutions with powers that are 
pertinent for self-governance, development and democracy. Those states which 
have not yet established such government institutions should establish them. 
 
*A clear procedure of supervision of woredas by the states should be devised. 
This procedure, in particular should provide a mechanism in which the states 
regulate, monitor, assist and when necessary intervene.   
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